

Societal Legitimacy of the Military: Turkey and Indonesia in Comparative Perspective

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Abstract

This article deals with a sub-field of civil-military relations that has often been neglected in scholarly inquiry: societal legitimacy of the military. What makes the military's role in social and political life legitimate in the eyes of the citizens? Comparatively studying Turkey and Indonesia, two countries that have large militaries with a long tradition of political involvement, the article aims to identify and analyze the factors that influence the military's legitimacy in society. Within this framework, six variables are taken into consideration: i) Historical foundations of the military; ii) Threat perceptions; iii) Civilian inefficiency; iv) Institutional structure of the military's influence on politics; v) Internal cohesiveness of the military; and vi) Economic interests of the military. Variations in these variables as observed in Turkish and Indonesian cases offer an insight on why the Turkish military continues to enjoy substantial legitimacy as the guardians of the nation and democracy, the Indonesian army fails to do so, as it is perceived as a threat against the democratization process and asked to stay out of politics.

Keywords

Civil-Military Relations, Democratization, Legitimacy, Turkey, Indonesia

Introduction

The role of the military in social and political life is a widely debated topic among both scholars and practitioners of politics. An important question that needs to be asked within this context is: What makes this role legitimate in the eyes of the citizens? This question is difficult to answer by merely examining the empirical evidence, which presents deeply entrenched puzzles originating from the relation between legitimacy and democracy. For instance, it is difficult to explain why a military that is criticized for obstructing democracy can be remarkably legitimate in its own society, whereas in another case a military that fully adheres to democratic values can be deemed as not being legitimate.

A better understanding of this subject can be achieved by utilizing the tools of comparative politics. Today's world offers a wide spectrum of different government and military systems, and a comparative study of cases, which are sufficiently similar to make a comparison meaningful, yet at the same time sufficiently different to allow for the identification of factors influencing the dependent variable, can help to explain what makes the role of military in social and political life legitimate in society.

This article compares the cases of Turkey and Indonesia. There are similarities between these two cases, which makes the comparison meaningful. Both countries have large militaries¹ with a long tradition of political involvement, and both countries were born after national armed struggles against foreign invaders. Turkey and Indonesia are also similar in the sense that both

are predominantly Muslim countries with large populations,² located in geopolitically crucial junctions at each ends of the Asian continent.

There are also differences between the two cases, which will be discussed in later parts of the article, where a series of independent variables is identified and compared for the two cases, Turkey and Indonesia, to explain the difference in the dependent variable. There is indeed a significant variation in the dependent variable, i.e. the role of military in social and political life, and this is another reason why Turkey is compared with Indonesia.

For the purpose of operationalizing the dependent variable, this article assumes that a close connection exists between individuals' trust towards an institution and the degree of this institution's legitimacy in the society. This connection appears in the shape of a virtuous cycle; as people trust an institution more, it enjoys higher legitimacy, and the more legitimate an institution is, the more it is trusted by people. In this respect, Turkey's military enjoys remarkably high levels of legitimacy vis-à-vis the society, which is evident in the results of public opinion surveys. A recent *Eurobarometer* poll shows that the institution that the Turkish people trust most is the military. 77% of the respondents confirmed their trust in the military, which was followed by the judiciary with 65%, the government and the parliament, both with 51% (European Commission 2010). There is a similar story when the degree of trust is evaluated for professions rather than institutions. A recent poll undertaken by the research company *GfK*

¹ Turkey's armed forces have 1,041,500 personnel of which 510,600 are in active duty. For Indonesia, these figures are 982,000 and 302,000 respectively (Hackett 2010, 164-168 and 405-408).

² Turkey has a population of 77.8 million of which 99.8% is Muslim, whereas Indonesia has a population of 242.9 million, of which 86.1% adheres to Islam (CIA Factbook).

Turkey reveals that among 20 different professions, soldiers are the fifth most trusted with 78%. Only teachers, firemen, doctors and postmen are trusted more, and the politicians are at the bottom with a mere 19% (GfK 2010).

Unfortunately the *Eurobarometer* survey is not available for Indonesia, however there are other surveys that can offer an insight. For instance, a public opinion poll undertaken by the *Islamic and Societal Research Center of Indonesia* shows that only 22% of the respondents laid their trust on the military, compared with 41% for religious leaders (Jakarta Post, 2007), whereas another poll carried out by the *Indonesian Research Institute* reveals that 82% of the respondents wanted the army's role to be limited to ensuring security against external threats (Balowski, 2005). This result is particularly significant considering that Indonesia -in contrast with Turkey- is facing a minimal level of external threats, if any. In short, the military in Indonesia, with all of its roles and activities that are not related to external threats, is far from being legitimate in the eyes of Indonesians.

The societal legitimacy of the role played military in social and political life is directly linked to the extent of civil-military relations in the country in question. This does not necessarily mean that there is simple causality between the two, rather it implies that variables that affect civil-military relations influence the legitimacy of the military as well, as will be shown in the comparative part of this article. Before proceeding to the comparative section, a theoretical framework will be established by investigating the relevant literature.

Theoretical Framework

Civil-military relations have always been of a center of attention for scholars,

since it is a main component of the political life in every state that has a military, i.e. almost everywhere in the world. It was in the 1950s, when the foundations of scholarly inquiry on civil-military relations were laid down, and the most influential study, which is still influencing academic work, was that of Samuel P. Huntington, who pointed to two forces shaping the military institutions of a society: "A functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security and a societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies and institutions dominant within the society" (Huntington 1957, 2). According to Huntington, military institutions would not be able to perform their military function if they only reflected social values. This creates a dilemma, because it is also impossible to maintain the military institutions within the society if they are shaped only through functional imperatives. A military that is subservient to the society would lose its ability to perform its functions, but on the other hand, if it does not reflect societal values, it would be a threat against the society. This is why the military is usually reluctant to accept societal values, especially those related to democracy, such as freedom of speech or individualism, because they would undermine its hierarchical structure. Huntington argued that there should be an adjustment and balance between the two imperatives.

According to Huntington, the emergence of professional officer corps results in a cleavage between the civilian sphere, which is actively directing the society and is responsible for the allocation of resources among important values including the military, and the military sphere, which is actively directing the coercive arm of the state and is responsible for the military security of the society. This cleavage results in a tension between the two spheres, which in turn raises the issue of the civilian control of the

military (Huntington 1957, 20).

The basic question in defining civilian control of the military is how to minimize the military power. Huntington offers two broad answers, one of which is the “subjective civilian control” that is achieved through maximizing the power of civilian groups vis-à-vis the military. Since there is a large variety of civilian interests, which are often in conflict with each other, it takes the shape of maximizing the power of a particular group or groups, i.e. particular government institutions, particular social classes and particular constitutional forms (Huntington 1957, 80-81). The other way of minimizing the military power is through the “objective civilian control”, which is completely the opposite of the subjective control in the sense that it implies the maximization of military professionalism and distribution of the political power between military and civilian groups, which are most conducive to professionalism among the members of officer corps (Huntington 1957, 83).

Whereas Huntington, who adopted a realist view on the human nature, advocated the objective control arguing that professionalism would lead to a neutral military including its autonomy within a military sphere with clearly defined boundaries, another pioneer of the scholarly investigation of civilian-military relations, Morris Janowitz advocated the other option, the subjective control of the military. According to him, the military should adopt the liberal values of the society and at the same time maintain its professionalism in conducting its military functions. He further argued that the military has become a constabulary force, like the police, which is always prepared to act but committed to minimum use of violence (Janowitz 1960, 148). In Janowitz’s model, the military maintains close links with the society that it is supposed to protect.

Empirical evidence accumulated during the decades following the publication of Huntington’s and Janowitz’s works led to criticism of these studies. Huntington was criticized with regard to complete isolation of the military being not desirable for the society, whereas his thesis that higher professionalism would prevent the military’s ability of contesting military power drew the attention of critics as well (Vankovska and Wiberg 2003, 19). On the other hand Janowitz was criticized for taking for granted that the societal values that are to be incorporated into the military are necessarily liberal and democratic ones (Vankovska and Wiberg 2003, 21)

Despite the criticism, Huntington and Janowitz continued to establish a reference for new studies, which either revised or combined the arguments of the two main approaches of subjective versus objective civilian control of the military.

In his study of military intervention in politics, Eric A. Nordlinger examined the different aspects of civilian control of the military and offered another a typology of praetorianism, where officers act either as: i) “Moderators” who exercise a veto power without taking the control of the government themselves; ii) “Guardians” who overthrow the government and retain governmental power in their hands for usually a few years in order to correct the deficiencies of the outgoing incumbents; or iii) “Rulers” who not only control the government but also dominate the regime attempting to control large parts of political, economic and social life (Nordlinger 1977, 21-27).

In one of the earlier studies in this field, Keith Hopkins examined how certain elements of the society influenced the relations between the civilian and military spheres. He argued that military interventions oc-

cur in a power vacuum where use of physical coercion is deemed more applicable than any other form of social control, and warned that although the military might seem an ideal solution for the management of conflicts, it prevents the independent growth of other forms of conflict management and limits further change (Hopkins 1966, 181).

Numerous studies have attempted to explain the dynamics behind military interventions. In an influential work, Samuel Finer analyzed military coups in countries with varying levels of political cultures. He argued that military intervention is a product of two sets of forces: i) Capacity and the propensity of the military to intervene; and ii) Conditions in the society in which the military operates. Accordingly, different levels of political culture lead to different characteristics of public opinion and therefore also to different kinds of intervention and resulting regime (Finer, 1988).

With the end of the Cold War, new models of civil-military relations began to emerge, mainly due to the fact that the transformation from bipolarity to multipolarity radically changed the threat perceptions, hence altering the definitions of concepts such as “war” and “military”. Whereas the two Cold War superpowers had militaries subordinated to civilian rule and pursuing traditional external military missions, new structures emerged with militaries facing a broader definition of security. The emergence of post-Cold War patterns in the global security environment resulted in novel approaches in academia. For instance, Michael C. Desch argued that the strength of civilian control of the military in most countries was shaped by structural factors, especially threats that affect the rulers, militaries and the societies (Desch, 1999). He further stated that threats can be either external (international) or internal (domestic)

and can vary in intensity (high or low). Accordingly, Desch established a 2x2 matrix, which explains the military control of the military as a function of location and intensity of threat:

Low external + high internal threats
“good” civilian control.

Low external + low internal threats
“mixed” civilian control.

High external + high internal threats
“poor” civilian control.

High external + low internal threats
“worst” civilian control.

Richard H. Kohn pointed to the gap between the theory and practice of the civilian control of military, arguing that whereas in principle civilian control was absolute and even the decisions of command were derived from civilian authority, in practice the military had achieved considerable autonomy and was even using democratic processes to further its own independence. Kohn further identified the following as the foundations of civilian control: i) Limiting the role of military to external threats; ii) Operating mechanisms of the government; iii) Countervailing power of the civilians; and iv) Assistance by the military from praetorianism (Kohn, 1997).

Over the past decade a series of studies appeared that have examined different contexts, not only from the communist states, but also others, especially those from countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia that have a history of dictatorship (e.g. Danopoulos and Watson, 1996; Barany, 1997; Mares, 1998; Koonings and Kruijt, 2002). These studies have contributed substantially to

the theoretical framework by incorporating findings from new empirical evidence.

There is currently a revival of academic interest in issues related to civil-military relations. More recent studies are dealing with subjects that have been hitherto ignored. For instance, a collection of essays edited by Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, has not only looked at different sub-actors of the civilian-military debate, such as legislatures and ministries of defense, but also dealt with issues like intelligence reform, defense budgets, conscription and professional military education (Bruneau and Tollefson, 2006).

The body of literature detailed above will be useful in identifying the variables of legitimacy that will be used in this article, in the sense the theories discussed here all provide certain components related to the civil-military issue that will be included in the model.

Civil-Military Relations in Turkey and Indonesia

Before dealing with the variables that define the extent to which the role of the military in political and social life is perceived to be legitimate in the society, and testing them comparatively in Turkish and Indonesian contexts, it will be useful to provide brief background information on the civil-military relations in these two countries.

Turkey

The Turkish Armed Forces (*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri* – TSK) has inherited its foundations from the Ottoman forces after the First World War. The remnants of the imperial forces were reorganized into a Turkish national army, which successfully fought the

War of Independence under the command of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In this sense, the army was right at the heart of the establishment of a new country, the Turkish Republic.

Turkey did not take part in the Second World War, however TSK remained mobilized throughout the war in order to confront a possible invasion by the Axis forces. The aftermath of the war coincided with Turkey's transition to multi-party democracy. In the elections of 1950, the Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti* – DP) defeated the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* – CHP) ending Turkey's single party era. In this period, relations between the military and the civilian government was defined by the military's indifference to who was in power. As Ümit Özdağ wrote, for the army officers of this era there was a clear distinction between the state and the government, and they felt themselves to be in the service of the state, not the government. It was the government that was supposed to serve the military, and as long as the military's needs were met and the Kemalist ideology was not compromised, it would not matter for the officers whether it was DP or CHP who was in office (Özdağ, 1997). Under the DP government, TSK sent troops to Korea in 1950, and, fearing a Soviet invasion, Turkey joined the NATO and initiated a comprehensive military modernization program with foreign support.

Atatürk's revolution had made the TSK the ultimate “guardian” of the Republic, but also detached it effectively from direct responsibility in government (Hale 1994, 88). This changed in 1960, when a group of junior officers intervened to overthrow an elected civilian government, charging it with high treason, misuse of public funds and abrogation of the constitution. Although he had not taken part in the coup, General Cemal

Gürsel became both the head of the state and the head of the executive. The prime minister and two of his ministers were executed and the military regime remained in power for 17 months. According to William Hale, this period was important in the sense that the military government consisted of officers who withdrew from active military duty and this resulted in severe tension between this group and their colleagues still in active duty at TSK (Hale 1994, 148).

The period after the military regime was one of civilian-military reconciliation. However, after the elections of 1969, unrest against the ruling Justice Party escalated especially within leftist circles, taking a violent form. Suspecting the preparation for a leftist coup within the military itself, the chief of general staff presented a memorandum to President Cevdet Sunay on March 12, 1971, demanding a strong and credible government. Prime Minister Demirel resigned to prevent an actual military take-over and his government was replaced by a “national unity” government led by a non-partisan prime minister. It was the beginning of a two and a half year period of unsuccessful experimentation with indirect military rule.

In 1974, TSK intervened against a coup in Cyprus that aimed to establish a union between Greece and the island and was backed by the Greek military junta in Athens. The conflict resulted in the division of the island between the Turkish Cypriots controlling the north and Greek Cypriots controlling the south. The second half of the decade was marked with political chaos in Turkey. When the instability took the form of intensive violence in left-right clashes, coupled with economic slump, the TSK took over on September 12, 1980, and the regime established by the Chief of General Staff General Kenan Evren lasted for more than three years. After the approval by referendum of the new con-

stitution, Evren organized general elections, held in November 1983. However, the referendum and the elections did not take place in a free and competitive setting. As Ergun Özbudun stated, “the 1983 Turkish transition is almost a textbook example of the degree to which a departing military regime can dictate the conditions of its departure” (Özbudun 2000, 117).

After 1983, when the civilian government of Turgut Özal took the office, Turkey embarked into a period of military disengagement. However TSK’s influence on politics continued. As Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu wrote, after 1983, the military has “used legal/constitutional, historical and structural reasons and mechanisms to retain its privileged position in issuing demands, policy suggestions and warnings on political matters” and done so at the expense of certain civilian groups like the left, labor, youth, and others (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 1997, 153). Such a warning as mentioned by Sakallıoğlu came in 1997, when the first elected Islamist prime minister of Turkey, Necmettin Erbakan, had to resign in the face of the increasing frequency of public warnings by the TSK. It was a signal from the TSK underlining its role as the guardians of the secular republic founded by Atatürk.

Meanwhile it was during late 1980s and 1990s when tension in the southeastern regions of Turkey due to ethnic separatism took the form a violent conflict. Armed attacks launched by the Kurdish separatist organization PKK against the military, other government units and civilians continues to date, having so far caused a human loss of around 42,000 (Şener, 2010). This struggle against separatism and terrorism, which is currently the greatest internal threat against Turkey, also symbolizes TSK’s dedication in protecting the territorial integrity of the republic as designated by Atatürk.

The rise of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* – AKP) to power in 2002 marked a turning point in Turkish politics. Having formed a single-party government, AKP embraced the European Union (EU) accession process and embarked upon a series of reforms in line with the union's Copenhagen Criteria. However, AKP's pro-Western orientation was not enough to erase suspicions and distrust stemming from the party's Islamist origins. This distrust reached a peak in April 2007, when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who had a majority in the Parliament enabling him to choose the next President without consulting the opposition, announced that his candidate would be Abdullah Gül, the foreign minister in his government. In response, the Turkish General Staff posted a statement on its website stating, "some circles who have been carrying out endless efforts to disturb fundamental values of the republic of Turkey, especially secularism, have escalated their efforts recently" and that these groups "do not refrain from exploiting holy religious feelings of our people, and they try to hide their real aims under the guise of religion" (BBC, 2007). The military's challenge to the government backfired. Not only Islamists, but also a majority of diplomats, commentators and intellectuals branded the military's declaration as an "Internet coup" and instead of being saluted as the defenders of the constitution, the military found itself in a position in which it was deemed as an aggressor against a democratically elected government.

What has changed between 1997 and 2007 is basically the fact that the EU accession process over this period has driven reforms that have undermined the military's role in politics. In a recent study, Şule Toktaş and Ümit Kurt argue that AKP's two governmental terms clearly illustrate "a civilianization in Turkish polity and democratic

consolidation in terms of civil-military relations" (Toktaş and Kurt 2010, 401). However, this does not necessarily have to mean that the role played by the military in internal affairs is losing legitimacy in society. Recent opinion polls, as discussed in the introduction part of this article, show that the military is still by far the most trusted institution in Turkey, whereas the civilian politicians remain in the bottom. Toktaş and Kurt accurately point to the need for a "mindset transformation" to accompany the EU induced changes in legislation, and for the civilianization process to be disseminated to every possible area in social life (Toktaş and Kurt 2010, 401). It is the Turkish mentality and culture, the Turks' way of living and seeing the world around them, which give the military its societal legitimacy, and for this reason legislative and/or institutional changes on their own are not enough to erode this legitimacy

Indonesia

The Indonesian Army (formerly: *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* - ABRI, currently: *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* - TNI) was initially formed during Indonesia's National Revolution in late 1940s, when it participated in a guerilla war against colonialist Dutch forces. In 1949, the Dutch formally recognized Indonesian independence, and in the early years of the republic several coalition governments were formed. The first parliamentary general elections were held in 1955, with Sukarno's Indonesian National Party (*Partai Nasional Indonesia* – PNI) emerging victorious from the ballot, and the Islamist parties as well as the Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia* – PKI) gaining support.

During this period, ABRI supported Sukarno, who was openly criticizing parliamentary democracy, when he declared the

Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*) in 1957 as an attempt to bring political stability. This was intended to appease the three main factions in Indonesian politics, i.e. ABRI, Islamic groups and the communists. At the same time martial law was declared in the country, bringing the military to the foreground of politics in Indonesia.

Over the period between 1963 and 1965, Indonesia entered into armed confrontation with the newly established state of Malaysia over the future of the island of Borneo. This event remarkably increased the reputation of the ABRI in the society. The confrontation, however, would come to an end when, in 1965, Indonesia was shaken with a domestic incident. On the night of September 30, six senior army generals were murdered and the next day an organization calling itself the 30th September Movement (*Gerakan 30 September*) was in control. In the following days, the blame fell on the PKI, which was accused of mounting a coup to set up a communist state. A high ranking general, Suharto, with the full support of the army, launched a manhunt, which would result in the death of hundreds of thousands of people accused of aiding the so-called communist coup attempt.

Suharto, in coalition with civilian powers, removed Sukarno from power and became the President in 1967 and this marked the era of the New Order (*Orde Baru*) that would last until 1998. The most important feature of Suharto's New Order was that civilian rule was replaced by military rule, in the sense that the military was given a "dual

function" through the doctrine of *Dwifungsi*, which, according to J. Soedjati Djwandono, implied that the military is not merely a state apparatus for national defense and security, but constituted a sociopolitical force that interacts with civil society (Djiwandono 1998, 45).³

ABRI immediately moved to consolidate its newly acquired power by strengthening its legitimacy through *Dwifungsi*, reducing the role and influence of political parties; creating its own political party (*Golkar*); expanding its presence in government at national and regional levels and de-politicizing the society. After 1980's, as Suharto's power grew, the ABRI was obliged to play a role as the guardian of the palace. This role brought the ABRI in direct collision with the public, when in May 1998, increased social unrest triggered by the Asian financial crisis forced Suharto to step down (Sukma 2003, 45). At the same time, ABRI's actions against separatist regions such as East Timor, Papua and Aceh Darussalam, were heavily criticized by the international community due to the atrocities committed there by army personnel.

After Suharto, Indonesia entered a period of democratization, with the first free and competitive elections of the country taking place in 2004, when -ironically but not surprisingly- a former army general, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, won the elections and became the president. Meanwhile, ABRI was renamed TNI and began a reformation process of itself.⁴ There are four principles on which the reform was based: i) The military

³ J. Soedjati Djwandono further argued that the origin of the *Dwifungsi* was grounded in the evolution of an ideology based on hostility toward the type of civilian supremacy over the military usually associated with liberal democracy (Djiwandono 1998, 48). Although *Dwifungsi* was in theory supposed to place the military and the people on an equal setting, in practice it led to an undermining of civilians by the military. ² Turkey has a population of 77.8 million of which 99.8% is Muslim, whereas Indonesia has a population of 242.9 million, of which 86.1% adheres to Islam (CIA Factbook).

⁴ According to Terence Lee, this is more than just a name change. It is seen as an attempt by the military to show that it is a national institution (Lee 2000, 700).

will no longer be in the forefront of politics; ii) The military will influence the political process indirectly; iii) The military will shift its sociopolitical position from that of occupier to that of influence; iv) The military will concede some of its sociopolitical functions to nonmilitary stakeholders (Lee 2000, 699-700).

In 2009, President Yudhoyono won the elections and began his second term as the president. His track record with regards to democratization and civil-military relations is rather mixed. The TNI has been removed from the forefront of politics, yet it retains some important privileges, including the territorial command structure, which provides the army with the ability to operate locally beyond the control of the central government. There has been progress with institutional reforms, but to what extent this progress translates into societal legitimacy for the military is another question. Peni Hanggarini argues that “military reforms should not only be in the minds of the military, but also be captured by civilians” (Hanggarini, 2010) and for now this is far from being the case in Indonesia.

Comparing the Legitimacy of the Military in Turkey and Indonesia

This section of the article will compare the Turkish and Indonesian cases with regard to different variables that are linked to civil-military relations and are expected to influence the extent to which a military is legitimate in the society. These variables are as follows:

- Historical foundations of the military.

- Threat perceptions.
- Civilian inefficiency.
- Institutional structure of the military’s influence on politics.
- Internal cohesiveness of the military.
- Economic interests of the military.

Historical Foundations of the Military

Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt argued that the military develops a strong identification with the nation they were called to defend. The “birthright principle” implies that the military is either perceived to have been at the birth of the nation or that without sacrifices by the military the nation would not have been formed or survived, and this places the military well, not only to defend the nation but also to define its essence (Koonings and Kruijt 2002, 19).⁵

In both Turkish and Indonesian cases, the military has such a birthright. Both TSK and ABRI have played a major role when their respective countries were born. The Turkish case refers to what the authors call “armies of successor states to territorial empires that played a role in the military, institutional and ideological effort to construct the successor state,” whereas the Indonesian case occurred “when armies were formed out of successful movements for independence from colonial domination” (Koonings and Kruijt 2002, 19).

Although in both cases the militaries have a birthright to defend the nation and to define its essence, the historical legacy

⁵ The authors noted that sometimes a political party can take on partly or fully this role, sometimes in close harmony with the armed branch of the movement in question (Koonings and Kruijt 2002, 33).

was stronger in the case of Turkey. Aylin Güney and Petek Karatekelioğlu pointed to three important legacies in the Turkish case, which helped TSK to build a legitimate guardianship role: i) Ottoman legacy, against which the military developed a mentality of westernization and modernization; ii) Legacy of the War of Independence; iii) Legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Kemalist ideology that provided the military with principles of secularism, democratic order and the territorial integrity of the republic (Güney and Karatekelioğlu, 2005).

For ABRI, the legitimacy brought about by historical legacy cannot be expected to be as strong as that of TSK, because in Indonesia, only the second of these three items is present. First, it is not the successor to a strong empire.⁶ Similarly, whereas Atatürk's legacy created a centripetal effect within the Turkish nation, bringing people together around the above mentioned principles, Sukarno's revolution and the "guided democracy" had a centrifugal effect, giving simultaneous impetus to communism, militant nationalism and political Islam. The national political philosophy, *Pancasila*, on the other hand, did not prove to be effective in pulling people together either.⁷

In short, whereas TSK had inflexible and solid principles to be the guardian of and therefore to be legitimate in the eyes of Turks, ABRI did not have a similar set of

principles (other than the third principle of the *Pancasila* that implies the unity of Indonesia and embodies the concept of nationalism) that are derived from the historical legacy and approved by the large majority of the people.

Threat Perceptions

At the heart of Samuel P. Huntington's analysis was the proposition that military institutions of a country are shaped by the threats it is facing and the social forces/institutions it has (Huntington, 1957). The first part of this argument will be dealt in this section and the second one in the next.

Countries and their militaries can face four different kinds of threat. In David Mares' typology, three of them are external, i.e. neighbors, great powers, transnational threats; and one is internal, i.e. domestic rivals (Mares, 1998). Currently, the security threats faced by Turkey are both external (neighboring countries) and internal (fundamentalism, ethnic/historical/religious separatism). Indonesia, on the other hand, is facing internal threats, again in the form of fundamentalism and separatism, but there is no external threat of significance. In both cases the internal threats are directed at the territorial integrity and the secular nature of the state, with the threats that have taken the form of armed conflict are those related

⁶ Indonesia was a myriad of different kingdoms and sultanates until the 16th century and a colony until the 20th century.

⁷ As the philosophical basis of the independent Indonesian state, which is derived from the Buddhist code of ethics, *Pancasila* embodies the five basic principles: i) Belief in the one and only God; ii) Just and civilized humanity; iii) Unity of Indonesia; iv) Democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives; v) Social justice for the whole of the people. The problem was that *Pancasila* was too flexible and hence allowed both Sukarno and Suharto to use it with their own interpretation. Also, it always remained at the center of radically differing opinions, with a main issue being the first principle, i.e. monotheism. In 1949, Muslim political groups had accepted a plural structure in terms of faith, in return for having the Muslims obligated to sharia. The government never followed this commitment, causing the Muslim groups to perceive *Pancasila* as betrayal and a threat. Although *Pancasila* can be seen as an effort of secularism, the military did not play a role as the guardian of secularism; it has opposed political Islam because of the fear of the emergence of a strong opposition to itself.

to separatism: PKK in Turkey; movements in Aceh, Papua as well as Timor (before it declared independence) in Indonesia.

Using Desch's 2x2 matrix discussed in the literature survey, one could conclude that the combination of threats leads to good civilian control of the military in Indonesia and poor civilian control of the military in Turkey. However, one should also add to the equation how these threats are perceived in the society. It is beyond the purpose to discuss the details of Kurdish separatism in Turkey, however it would be fair to state that the struggle against terrorism and PKK in particular has created in "rallying 'round the flag effect" within the Turkish society, with the flag-bearer being the TSK.

Have the actions of the Free Aceh Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* – GAM) created the same threat perception with the same effect in Indonesia as the PKK did in Turkey?⁸ Indonesia is a heterogeneous country with more than 300 ethnic groups. Furthermore, as an archipelago of 17,500 islands, the country is spread over an area of 1.9 million square kilometers. Under these conditions of fragmentation, an independence movement in Aceh is not likely to be perceived as a major threat in other parts of the country. A movement such as that of GAM is not likely to create a "rallying 'round the flag effect" in support of the military anywhere in Indonesia, especially considering the mass resentment over the extent of the military's past abuses, not only in Aceh,

but also Timor, Papua, Moluccan Islands and other parts of the country including Jakarta. The difference with the Turkish case with regard to PKK is, as Aylin Güney argued, that TSK's actions enjoyed legitimacy from the ordinary Kurdish people who did not identify themselves with the PKK, and TSK is involved in intensive social development programs in the region (Güney 2002, 173). None of these two factors has been the case in Aceh.⁹

Civilian Inadequacy

According to Koonings and Kruijt, civilian inadequacy is a factor legitimizing military involvement in politics. According to this view, civilians may be anything from inefficient, through divided, self-interested and corrupt, down to disloyal and anti-national (Koonings and Kruijt 2002, 21). Nordlinger linked civilian inadequacy to coups, arguing that the poor performance of civilian governments increase the incidence of coups (Nordlinger 1977, 86).

In Turkey, civilian inadequacy was the major reason behind all the three coups, in 1960, 1971 and 1980. In all three cases, the military intervened, stayed only for a reasonable period, and gained important exit guarantees that enhanced its role in the subsequent democratic regime (Özbudun 2000, 105). In Indonesia, on the other hand, the 1965 coup was not only a result of civilian inadequacy; in fact it replaced one non-dem-

⁸ The similarity between the two cases is that GAM was also a separatist organization, seeking independence for the Aceh region of Sumatra from Indonesia. It was launched in 1976 and until 2005 when its armed wing was disbanded following a peace deal with Jakarta, it caused a human loss of more than 15,000. The main difference is that whereas PKK is pursuing ethnic separatism, the roots of GAM's separatism was historical, and whereas the PKK is internationally recognized as a terrorist organization by United Nations, NATO, and a number of states including the United States, GAM is not.

⁹ It should be noted that the internal threat perception has currently reached even lower levels. East Timor separated from Indonesia in 1999 and became an independent state in 2002, peace was concluded in Aceh in 2005 and the Free Papua Movement became a marginal domestic actor. The Indonesian army has also begun to reduce the number of its troops in the so-called conflict regions.

ocratic with another. After gaining power, Suharto did not attempt to gain exit guarantees, because he never intended to exit. Facing civilian inadequacies, he attempted to solve the problem by appointing military officers to the ranks in civilian administration in order to increase the efficiency of the latter.¹⁰ In Nordlinger's typology, in Turkey the military was a "moderator" switching to the role of "guardian" for short periods of time, whereas in pre-reform Indonesia it was the "ruler" (Nordlinger, 1977).

Military organizations are by definition regarded to as being superior in organization, management and skills, compared to civilian governments. This superiority legitimizes military intervention in cases when civilian administration fails, civilian politicians are weak and divided and these weaknesses and dividedness results in the collapse of order. However, the legitimacy can only be maintained if the military leaves the political scene back to the civilians as soon as order is established. This was the case in Turkey. In Indonesia, on the other hand, although the military's intervention for the sake of providing efficiency that the civilian's are not able to offer –especially in the field of economic development– was initially welcome by the people, it began to deteriorate as the country's economic and political stability worsened.

Institutional Structure of the Military's Influence on Politics

Militaries have institutional and informal mechanisms of influencing government

policy, however this section will only focus on the former. In Turkey, the military influences policy in an indirect way, i.e. through recommendations rather than directives. The main official institution through which to exercise influence is the National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Konseyi* - MGK), which is an advisory organ composed of an advisory organ, chaired by the head of the state, and composed of the chief of the general staff, four main commanders of TSK and selected cabinet members of the government. For Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, the MGK embodies the fact that "the military has not only gained more strength vis-à-vis the civilian actors, but by participating in the civilian authorities' decision-making process has also begun to extend its authority over areas that were traditionally under civilian control" (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 1997, 157).

In Indonesia, the military has traditionally had a "direct" influence on policymaking, although this position is changing as required by the latest internal reform wave of the military. During the Suharto period, the *Dwifungsi* doctrine of ABRI made it a direct participant in politics. To start with, military officers were employed at civilian functions within the state apparatus. According to Henk Schulte Nordholt, between 30-50% of all top functions at the national level (Ministers and Heads of Department at ministries) and 50-70% of provincial level governors and district officers had a military background (Nordholt, 2002).¹¹ Furthermore, 20% of the seats in the legislature were reserved for military officers. In other words, during the Suharto period, generals were not influencing the policy-makers,

¹⁰ In his state address of 1967, Suharto said, "the presence of ABRI members in government institutions is due to ABRI's role as a functional group and for technical reasons and for reasons of efficiency for the success of the Government's efforts."

¹¹ Mary P. Callahan wrote that in 1973, one-third of cabinet members, two-thirds of provincial governors and one-half of ambassadors were either active-duty or retired ABRI officers. In 1977, more than 21,000 ABRI personnel were seconded to civilian jobs; the number fell gradually to 14,000 in 1992 (Callahan 1999).

they were the policy-makers themselves.

This situation started to change with the post-Suharto reform period. Appointments of military officers to civilian posts still do exist, but they are made in a more open and transparent way. The military has no longer a quota of seats in parliament, however the biggest party in today's ruling coalition in Indonesia, *Golkar*, is embodying the political interests of the army and is likely to remain this way.

Internal Cohesiveness of the Military

Historical evidence suggests that it is not possible to talk about perfect internal cohesiveness as far as the Turkish military is concerned. Military coups of both 1960 and 1971 involved factions within the army acting outside the chain of command. The coup in 1980 was "successful" in the sense that it was executed within the chain of command and the army acted as a single cohesive unit, but increasing politicization during the 1990s led to renewed factionalism in the Turkish military. However, there are two important factors that contribute to the relative internal cohesiveness of TSK. First, the Turkish military is driven by an indigenous ideology, i.e. the state creed of Kemalism (Jenkins 2001, 21). Adhering to the same principles and pursuing the same ideals brings the officers together and helps to create unity, a single body aimed at a single target, although factionalism may emerge when different groups devise different ways to reach this target. The second factor is the centralized structure of TSK, which, together with high discipline and low level of corruption, helps to hold the military body together.

In Indonesia, the army is decentralized

due to the territorial command structure, which divides the country into 10 regional commands, which are further divided down to the village level, in a way resembling the civilian administration. This, together with the business interests of the military and the vast size of the country, causes a great problem as far as the cohesiveness of the army is concerned. On the other hand, as Rizal Sukma noted, lack of discipline within the military is another major problem, and human rights violations and involvement in illegal activities by the members of the military are frequently reported (Sukma 2003, 52). Despite a decrease in the number of incidents over the past years, army abuses are still reported, especially in Papua (Vaswani, 2010).

Economic Interests of the Military

In many countries, militaries run large enterprises, mostly in defense industry, but also in other sectors of the economy. According to Emanuel De Kadt, "this gives them access to resources independent from those voted by parliament or allocated by government, and leverage over their supposed civilian masters by decreasing their degree of dependence" (De Kadt 2002, 325).

Indonesia under Suharto was an extreme case of military involvement in the business, which found its legitimization in the dual function of the ABRI. Its involvement in business expanded rapidly through a large number of companies, many disguised as "cooperatives" and "foundations." In time, the military came to own a huge commercial empire ranging from golf courses to construction companies, with army officers running businesses of different scales simultaneously with their military

duties.¹² During the New Order, only 30% of the military's budget was sourced from the central government, with the rest being self-financed. However, despite its economic returns, this opaque system led to increased corruption, collusion and nepotism, as well as involvement in illegal business. Since the foundations were used to channel the funds, tax evasion was also widespread.

A *Human Rights Watch Report* draws attention to the many ways in which military economic entanglements fuelled abuses of power, including human rights violations that occur when troops use violence to further business interest and involve in predatory economic behavior rather than protecting the citizens (HRW 2006). As a part of the reform process, a 2004 law required the military to divest itself of all its commercial interests in more than 1,500 businesses by 2009. In October 2009, having missed this target, President Yudhoyono issued a decree ordering the TNI to transfer its businesses -worth \$240 million- to the Ministry of Defense, which was supposed to run them and receive the profits (Wright, 2009). However, the decree did not specify a deadline, and currently many businesses remain under the control of the military.

In Turkey, the military's business interests are carried out through the Armed Forces Pension Fund (*Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu* – OYAK), which was founded after the coup of 1960.¹³ The primary source of OYAK's funds is a compulsory levy on

the salaries of TSK's serving officers, who are, together with the pensioners, OYAK's members. OYAK has equity investments in 28 companies, concentrated in the automotive, cement, financial, service, and iron-steel sectors. Many of the investments are joint ventures with Turkish corporations or foreign multinationals. Although OYAK is criticized for "militarizing the economy" and "being a direct military involvement in the economy, rather than a pension fund involved in profitable investments with the private sector" (Parla, 2002), it is not run by active military personnel, and it is far from exhibiting the negative aspects of the Indonesian military's business involvement, such as corruption, illegality and human right violations.

Conclusion

Militaries of both Turkey and Indonesia are involved in politics to some extent and the Turkish military has a longer history of coups compared to the Indonesian army. However, whereas the Turkish military continues to enjoy substantial legitimacy as the guardians of the nation and democracy, the Indonesian army fails to do so, as it is perceived as a threat against the democratization process and asked to stay out of politics.

Although a comparison covering only two countries will by no means be sufficient for theory building, some analytical lessons are extracted from this study enable us to

¹² A *New York Times* story was about a deputy chief of general staff, whose official salary was \$600. This general was simultaneously appointed as the chairman of a timber company in Borneo where the army had a majority stake. According to the same story, a well-paid general can easily earn \$10,000 a month from employment or business activity on the sidelines (Greenlees 2005).

¹³ Another business arm of TSK is the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerini Güçlendirme Vakfı – TSKGV) established in 1987. Through its corporate subsidiaries, this organization is active in the defense industry, aiming to establish new defense industry branches, and to contribute to the development of the combat capacity of TSK.

better understand the factors that make a military legitimate in the eyes of the people it is supposed to protect:

Historical legacies matter: Having taken part at the founding of a nation is an important factor that makes the military legitimate, but it is not sufficient. The historical legacy becomes a stronger factor, if the military manages to position itself as the ultimate guardian of the values and principles that were designated by the founding fathers and are shared and embraced by the majority of the people.

i) The greater the perceived threats of a nation and the more justified the methods applied by the military in dealing with these threats, the greater is the legitimacy the military can enjoy. An important point here is the extent to which the military can establish and support a “rallying ‘round the flag effect” among the population.

ii) The inadequacy of the civilian administrations to deal with vital issues increases the legitimacy of the military. However there is an important point here. The legitimacy will only be maintained if the military intervenes to correct the situation and exits as soon as the order is established. Otherwise, if it sticks to power, it would rapidly undermine its own legitimacy.

iii) The more indirect the military’s involvement in politics, the higher is its legitimacy. Interference that is channeled through relevant institutions and taking the form of recommendations rather than directives, but still able to be effective are more legitimate than direct forms, which involve either direct dictation of directives to civilians or replacing civilian administrators with military officers.

iv) The higher the cohesiveness of the military body (which requires centralized

structure) and the greater the discipline and the lower the corruptedness among its members, the higher is the legitimacy it enjoys, because it would be perceived a single, unitary institution sticking to a single ideology and guarding it. Decentralization, corruption and lack of discipline would damage this picture.

v) The lower the scope of the military entanglement in business activities and the less the corruption related to it, the higher is the legitimacy of the military in society.

It has to be noted that in the post-Suharto period, the consecutive Indonesian administrations have been more aware of the rapid deterioration of the legitimacy of the military, which has hit the bottom in 1998 when Suharto was forced to resign and a reform period began. These reforms address all the six factors mentioned above with the exception of the first one that is related to the historical heritage. It has also to be remarked that Indonesia has a long-term approach towards military reform, and has set the year 2029 as the deadline. So far the reform process has a mixed record, with gradual improvement in certain areas. Although several observers are fascinated by the achievements to date, Indonesian reform has still a long way to cover, especially in the area of civil-military relations.

Another important point is that the TSK is also undergoing through reform although its extent is not as comprehensive as in the Indonesian case. In Indonesia, the military is reformed due to “internal” pressures, i.e. to regain legitimacy in society. In Turkey, the military has no real problem concerning the legitimacy of its role in political and social life. Turkish military reforms are undertaken as a response to “external” pressures, especially to the requirements brought about as a part of the EU accession process.

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